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Abstract 
This chapter analyses the challenges related to evaluations of large-scale public sector 
reforms. It is based on a meta-evaluation of the evaluation of the reform of the 
Norwegian Labour Market and Welfare Administration (the NAV-reform) in Norway, 
which entailed both a significant reorganization of the central, regional and local 
government and a social policy reform. Meta-evaluations assess the usefulness of one 
or more evaluations and should not be confused with meta-analyses. The purpose of 
this meta-evaluation was to identify general principles for organizing the evaluations 
of large-scale public sector reforms. 
Based on the analysis, eight crucial points of attention when evaluating large-scale 
public sector reforms are elaborated. We discuss their reasons and argue that other 
countries will face the same challenges and thus can learn from the experiences of 
Norway. 
 
Preprint version – to be included in Handbook of Social Policy Evaluation: 
Hansen, M. B., Breidahl, K. N., Furubo, J.-E., & Halvorsen, A. 2017. Eight attention 
points when evaluating large-scale public sector reforms. In B. Greve (Ed.), 
Handbook of Social Policy Evaluation. London: Edward Elgar Publishing.   
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Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we explore what aspects require special attention when evaluating 
large-scale public sector reforms. 
Our response to the question builds empirically on a meta-evaluation of the largest 
public-sector reform of the 2000s in Norway –  the reform of the Norwegian Labour 
Market and Welfare Administration (called the NAV-reform in what follows), which 
was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in 2005. The NAV-reform entailed both a 
significant reorganization of the central, regional and local government and a social 
policy reform. When the reform was adopted, the Norwegian Parliament decided that 
it should be thoroughly evaluated. On this background, a large-scale research-based 
evaluation was organized, the major findings of which were presented at a conference 
in Oslo in June 2014 and in a final book from the evaluation (Andreassen & Aars, 
2015). The evaluation has been subjected to a meta-evaluation (Stufflebeam, 2001) 
and it is the results of this that, in a condensed and worked up form, are presented in 
this chapter1 (Breidahl, Furubo, Halvorsen, & Hansen, 2014). The purpose of this 
meta-evaluation has been to extract general experiences from the evaluation, which 
are relevant for the organization of future research-based evaluations of large-scale 
public sector reforms. 
 
Theoretically, our response is based on the thesis that large-scale public sector 
reforms have certain general characteristics that entail that any evaluation of them 
must address and balance different and often conflicting considerations, which 
manifest themselves in various ways as paradoxes, dilemmas, limits and trade-offs 
connected with the organization and use of the evaluation (Hood & Peters, 2004; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011b). These are clearly evident in our empirical analyses of the 
evaluation of the NAV reform, and we argue theoretically that these challenges are of 
a more general nature. 
 
On the basis of the analyses, we conclude that there are eight general points of 
attention connected with the organization of evaluations of large-scale public sector 
reforms, which decision makers should pay particular attention to. 
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Below, we start with a brief section on theory, in which we delimit the phenomenon 
of evaluating large-scale public sector reforms, give an account of the very limited 
earlier research within the area, and explain the key concepts of the analysis. After 
briefly explaining the methods used in the meta-evaluation, we present the results in 
the form of eight points of attention. The article ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
Theory and previous research on the evaluation of reforms 
 
“… while the fields of public-sector reform and of evaluation have each brought forth 
a huge body of literature and research, these two realms have been largely treated as 
separate entities” (Wollmann, 2003: 1). 
 
The international research-based knowledge of evaluations of large-scale public-
sector reforms is limited. The scant literature available indicates that large-scale 
public sector reforms are seldom evaluated (Breidahl, Gjelstrup, Hansen, & Hansen, 
2017 forthcoming; Pollitt, 1995; Wollmann, 2003) and that they, in the cases where 
they are evaluated, are typically evaluated internally, as was the case with the Danish 
Local Government Reform (LGR). Although there have been numerous large-scale 
and minor public sector reforms in recent decades (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011a; 
Wollmann, 2003), actual research-based evaluations organized by a research council 
have been absent; thus, it is a rare case we are analysing here. 
 
Characteristics of large-scale public sector reforms 
We delimit the term large-scale public sector reforms to reforms that have an impact 
on substantial parts of society and cuts across governmental levels and policy sectors. 
Thus they are multi-level, multi-site and multi-sector reforms and, as in the case of 
the NAV-reform in Norway, usually mandated by a National Parliament or, in the 
case of federal systems, regional Parliament.  
Such reforms are characterized by affecting many people, by having several often 
difficult-to-reconcile objectives, by developing and changing over time, and by being 
irreversible in the sense that they cannot or can only with difficulty be reversed back 
to the starting point. The large-scale public sector reforms that have been carried out 
in recent decades in a large number of countries have involved paradoxes, trade-offs 
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and dilemmas (Hood & Peters, 2004; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011b), the exact 
significance of which has varied and depended on the context. 
 
Many reforms are decided upon or developed in a border zone between politics and 
administration, but also between institutions within and outside the state. Within 
individual states, decisions of political significance are made, which establish the 
framework for politicians’ possibilities to act and are not affected by elected 
politicians. 
 
The objectives are often manifold, and it is in many cases unclear what is being 
described as the actual objectives. This may be the result of previous political 
compromises having focused on the formulation of objectives (March & Olsen, 
1983). How the reform should be presented with regard to objectives and intent has 
often been more controversial than the actual content of the reform (Baier, March, & 
Saetren, 1986). The official objectives thus often imperfectly reflect the ambitions 
behind the reform. 
 
Since political-administrative reforms are complex and affect many people and policy 
areas, the effects are usually difficult to predict, and the most important effects can 
easily be beyond the official objective and target areas (Margetts, 6, & Hood, 2010; 
Wollmann, 2003). 
 
Large-scale public sector reforms are often also characterized by being irreversible. 
The reform may be adjusted, but it is impossible to go back to doing things the way 
they were done before the reform without paying a high political and economic price. 
 
The complexity and scale of the reform create some challenges for the evaluator. 
First, the actual nature of the reform is often modified during the implementation 
process and the object of the evaluation itself can therefore be difficult to pin down. 
Second, the reform is only one of the many factors that affect the fulfilment of 
objectives. Not only do a number of other state provisions have an effect, but also 
many other international and domestic factors. Third is the duality of the time 
perspective: It takes time before the effects of a large-scale reform become apparent, 
but the longer the time that passes, the harder it becomes to pinpoint which changes 
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are due to the reform and what significance other factors have (Hansen, 2010). 
Fourth, the perception of the various objectives of the reform and their 
interrelationship is not obvious. And finally, the context in which the evaluation may 
be intended to be used is often different from the context in which the evaluation is 
carried out. In other words, “reality” has changed during the process. 
 
These factors, and others, help underline that there are considerable limitations in the 
use of knowledge that evaluations of large-scale political reforms can contribute to. 
This is especially true of questions like “How did it go?”, “What was the result?”, 
“Were the objectives achieved?” etc.  
 
Attention points, paradoxes, dilemmas, trade-offs and limits 
In the following analysis section, the attention points identified in connection with the 
meta-evaluation of the NAV reform are analysed. 
 
By attention points we mean critical points that the key players in the evaluation – the 
commissioning party, the evaluator and those who are being evaluated – must be 
aware of, address and make decisions on. Attention points in relation to reforms and 
evaluations of them often arise from a balancing act between two opposing but 
legitimate considerations (Margetts et al., 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011b). It may 
be a case of more or less sharp trade-offs, where assigning greater priority to one 
consideration must necessarily mean giving lower priority to another. There may also 
be some limits – for example, the consideration of independent research – which must 
be complied with if the evaluation is to be considered research-based. There may also 
be full-blown dilemmas, which mean that the evaluation will be criticized, regardless 
of the results it may produce. Sometimes, however, paradoxes – in the sense of 
apparent contradictions – turn out to be precisely that: apparent. If they are dealt with 
in a pragmatic and solution-oriented way, taking into account the specific context in 
which the evaluation is being conducted, they can in practice prove to be false 
contradictions. 
 
Data generation and methods of analysis 
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Data generation took place through analyses of documents and interviews with key 
players in the NAV evaluation in the period from February to June 2014. 
 
In order to identify the stakeholders’ perceptions and assessments of the organization, 
processes, output and application of the evaluation, twelve qualitative interviews were 
conducted with key players in the evaluation as representatives of the main 
stakeholders of the evaluation: the Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), KS (Kommunernes 
Sentralforbund), the interest group and member authority for municipalities in 
Norway, the Research Council of Norway, the steering committee and a number of 
selected researchers. These interviews were transcribed and subsequently coded.  
The resources of the metaevaluation in terms of time and funding did not permit us to 
include all relevant stakeholders and especially the decision to exclude the politicians 
from the analysis may imply that some important problems related to the politics of 
evaluation has been omitted.  
 
With a view to identifying the output, as available in the publications, an analysis was 
made of the publications from the NAV evaluation that was published up until the end 
of May 2014 (a total of 87 publications). These have been read and coded in order to 
identify the content that is relevant for the meta-evaluation, concentrating on the focus 
of the publications, the types of questions and the methods used. 
 
The results of the empirical studies were analysed and discussed at the meetings of 
the expert panel in March, April, May and June 2014. On this background, the panel 
of experts developed a number of general attention points, which were presented at a 
concluding data generation seminar for the main stakeholders of the evaluations in 
mid-June 2014. 
 
On the basis of feedback from the seminar and further discussions by the panel of 
experts, the final report was submitted early July 2014 with the revised eight attention 
points (Breidahl et al., 2014). What we present below is a further theorized version of 
the eight attention points found in our empirical analysis. In our analysis we attempt 
to show how the eight attention points represent some fairly universal trade-offs and 
dilemmas likely to be present in most if not all evaluations of large-scale public sector 
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reforms. While we believe that the eight attention points are fairly universal, we do 
not claim that the eight points catch all important problems related to organizing such 
evaluations, and especially the omission of the politicians from the analysis may have 
created a bias towards more administrative issues.  
 
Eight attention points when evaluating large-scale public sector reforms 
 
Attention point 1: What advantages and disadvantages are there in connection with 
an external research-based evaluation compared to alternative models? 
 
The Research Council of Norway organizes the evaluation of the NAV reform and 
several other political-administrative reforms in Norway. Even though there are few 
comparable studies of the organization of the task of evaluation (Pollitt, 1995; 
Wollmann, 2003), these studies indicate that this Norwegian practice is remarkable, 
and it is therefore worthwhile to consider its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
The organization of an evaluation concerns a key theme in evaluation research 
(Dahler-Larsen & Krogstrup, 2001; Vedung, 1997), which has explored in particular 
the advantages and disadvantages of internal and external evaluations, respectively, in 
relation to the objectives of the evaluation. From an ideal-typical perspective, a 
distinction is made here between the objectives of accountability (control), 
improvement, and basic knowledge development, which in principle call for different 
forms of organization. Vedung (1997: 117-20) thus argues that the objectives of 
accountability and basic knowledge development are best achieved through a form of 
external evaluation, while improvement is best ensured through the organization of an 
internal evaluation. 
 
In the Norwegian evaluation, all three objectives were part of the evaluation that was 
commissioned (Breidahl et al., 2014). The meta-evaluation of the NAV reform 
indicates support for Vedung’s thesis in the sense that the evaluation of the NAV 
reform was most successful with regard to general knowledge development and to a 
certain extent, analyses of the effects of the reform. In contrast, there was little 
continuous feedback concerning improvements and adjustments in connection with 
the implementation of the reform. 
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The choice of model for how the evaluation should be organized can be discussed 
from several perspectives. It is not always self-evident that a specific “model” will 
create a better basis for the evaluation to, for example, contribute to long-term 
knowledge development than other models. However our empirical findings and 
theoretical arguments indicate that the choice of model has implications for the 
problems evaluators face. If a research-based external evaluation model is chosen 
which also is intended to generate feedback to the on-going adaptation of the reform, 
special attention is needed for this purpose in the evaluation process. If an internal 
evaluation model is chosen, which is intended to also generate trustworthy 
documentation and long-term knowledge, special attention is needed for this purpose 
in the evaluation process.  
 
Another discussion concerns the impartiality of the external evaluator. At times, the 
conclusions of external evaluations conducted by consultancy firms are criticized for 
being “made to order” (Wildavsky, 1996). A management team will often have an 
interest in controlling the results of a given external evaluation, but the very suspicion 
of such a manipulation having taken place can undermine the credibility of the results 
of an evaluation. Here, the organization in the research council has the distinct 
advantage that such a suspicion is eliminated or at least minimized. This requires, of 
course, that respect for freedom of research is mandatory and that the research council 
is a guarantor for this. It should also be added that the legitimacy that must be 
presumed to be related to a research council evaluation is not unique and can also be 
delivered by other institutions. 
 
The above analysis of different models for the organization of evaluations may appear 
somewhat superficial. However, it will hopefully give rise to more precise analyses of 
advantages and disadvantages of different models than have been possible within the 
framework of this meta-evaluation. Norway has from an international perspective 
chosen an unusual and noteworthy model by using the research council as the 
organizer. The model has certainly been effective in relation to those objectives of the 
evaluation, which emphasizes contributing to long-term knowledge development.  
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Attention point 2: What actors should be included in the formulation of the evaluation 
task for the evaluation of large-scale public sector reforms? 
 
When the commissioning party formulates the evaluation task of large-scale public 
sector reforms, it is an advantage to involve different actors representing expertise 
concerning various aspects of the reform and its evaluation. This raises the 
fundamental question of which actors should/must formulate the task and thereby also 
who should have the possibility of influencing the design of the actual evaluation. 
This may concern in part, an involvement of researchers and experts, and in part, an 
involvement of the stakeholders of the evaluation who are included in the steering 
committee. 
 
The involvement of researchers and experts can have the advantage that they can 
provide advice and guidance, which can contribute to a clarification of the task. The 
challenge that may arise, however, is that in small countries like the Scandinavian 
countries, but perhaps also in larger countries, due to relatively small research 
environments within certain areas, it may be the same researchers who subsequently 
choose to apply to participate in the evaluation. They will therefore, all things being 
equal, have a competitive advantage compared to other evaluation consortia. In our 
view, it is a question of balancing the consideration of a satisfactory formulation of 
the task and the regard for an equal and fair tender process. We are dealing with a 
trade-off between two legitimate considerations, and the way they are dealt with in 
the specific situation must be a managerial decision. However, it is not appropriate if 
problems of impartiality prevent the best possible expertise from being drawn on in 
the formulation of the evaluation task. An increased use of international experts may 
be part of the solution. 
 
The inclusion of the evaluation stakeholders who are part of the steering committee in 
the actual formulation of the evaluation task can contribute to a sense of ownership 
and a high degree of involvement in the evaluation on the part of the steering 
committee. The inclusion of the stakeholders in the formulation of the evaluation task 
also provides an opportunity to clarify stakeholders’ expectations to and 
understanding of what an evaluation is and what it demands of them in terms of 
resources and involvement.  
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One possibility, which concerns the inclusion of potential actors on a more general 
level, is inviting all potential evaluators to an open seminar, where the formulation of 
the evaluation task is discussed. To the extent that national experts, who may also bid 
for the task, might be selected for inclusion, this bias should be taken into account in 
the organization of the tender process. There should be enough time for consortia that 
have not been involved to be able to formulate a competitive bid and the tender 
documents should be designed in a way that facilitates this work. 
 
Attention point 3: Which members should be included in the steering committee? 
 
In evaluating large-scale public sector reforms there are important considerations that 
indicate that the most essential stakeholders should be represented in the steering 
committee, as was also the case in the evaluation of the NAV reform. This applies to 
representatives of the commissioning party, the organizations that will be 
implementing the reform, and the evaluators (researchers). In addition, relevant user 
organizations may also be represented in the steering committee. A composition like 
this can contribute to promoting knowledge sharing and the use of results and to 
ensuring that the committee is a forum where the most significant differences of 
opinion and practical problems concerning the evaluation can be dealt with and 
resolved. 
 
It has been argued that the commissioning party should not be part of the steering 
committee, since this may represent a breach of the arm’s length principle. In the 
same way it could be argued that other stakeholders, such as the organizations 
responsible for implementation, should not be part of the steering committee. It can be 
problematic if the legitimacy that is connected with autonomy and a high quality of 
research can be disputed. 
 
The balance between on the one hand, the commissioning party’s and other groups’ 
legitimate interests and on the other hand, the consideration of freedom of research, 
can often be achieved through the procedures that are established for cooperation 
between the steering committee and the researchers. 
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Here it is again a balancing act, which depends on the characteristics of the specific 
reform that is to be evaluated. In the case of a strongly politicized reform, where there 
is a high degree of societal distrust in the role of the commissioning party, a 
formalization of the arm’s length principle through the composition of the steering 
committee may be considered. The commissioning party in these cases might, 
however, have observer status.  
 
Attention point 4: What principles should characterize the relationship between the 
steering committee and researchers? 
 
In a research-based evaluation organized by the Research Council of Norway, great 
importance will naturally often be attached to long-term knowledge development, 
while the continuous instrumental use of preliminary results, which could be useful in 
connection with an adaptation and implementation of the reform, will often require 
particular attention. In the classical trade-off between “quick-and-dirty” or “slow-and-
clean” analysis, those responsible for implementing the reform will need the former, 
while the basic inclination of researchers will be to stick to the latter. 
  
Here, the steering committee, together with the project manager and research 
coordinators, play an essential and legitimate role as a bridge builder and intermediary 
between research and the implementation process. An active steering committee can 
furthermore help ensure that resources and competences that can be useful for the 
evaluation are made available. This can often have a very positive effect on the 
evaluation process and the quality of the results of the evaluation.  
 
Care must nonetheless be taken to ensure that this role as a bridge builder and 
intermediary does not break with the arm’s length principle and the consideration of 
high quality research. There are certain limits to intervention that must be observed to 
ensure that the qualities that characterize research-based evaluations are maintained 
and the legitimacy of the evaluation is protected.  
 
It is reasonable that the commissioning party and the members of the steering 
committee are able to access information about analyses and conclusions of the 
evaluation before they are published. In this way, the commissioning party and the 
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organizations responsible for implementation can keep abreast of the situation and 
quickly draw on relevant results during the continuous implementation of the reform. 
 
The commissioning party and the organizations responsible for implementation will 
also in some cases have factual knowledge that can contribute to improving the 
quality of publications made in connection with the evaluation. 
 
However, this type of intervention must never be more than helpful suggestions. The 
impartiality of the researchers must never be questionable. This applies in general and 
is especially important in relation to evaluations of large-scale public sector reforms. 
With these reforms, there will often be marked interest in influencing the evaluation 
in certain directions. There must never be any doubt about the integrity of the research 
and the impartiality of the commissioning party and other players’ possible interest in 
concealing problems in connection with the implementation process. 
 
Attention point 5: How can the numerous and difficult-to-reconcile objectives of the 
evaluation be dealt with? 
 
The choice of the research council as the organizer of the evaluation means that the 
commissioning party – consciously or unconsciously – has decided to prioritize long-
term knowledge development as an essential element of the evaluation task. By 
protecting and prioritizing the research council’s long and well-developed tradition of 
ensuring high quality, the aim has (presumably) been to ensure the quality and 
legitimacy of the evaluation in that the research should contribute to an arm’s length 
principle stipulated by the commissioning party. A sub-objective has also been to 
contribute with the continuous applicability of the results of the evaluation in 
connection with the implementation.  
 
The challenges that these different intended uses give rise to should have been subject 
to more extensive discussion even before the choice of the form of organization was 
made. There is tension if not contradiction between long-term knowledge generation 
and providing short-term advice for policy implementation. Part of the tension is 
captured in the following quote from the French sociologist and anthropologist 
Marcel Mauss: “In scientific matters, it is impossible to proceed too slowly; while in 
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practical matters one cannot wait” (Mauss quoted in Rosanvallon, 2012, p. 57) 
Although the quote pushes the issue to the extreme, there is a tendency for long-term 
knowledge development to place other and in part conflicting demands on the 
evaluation than those that arise from continuous feedback on the implementation 
process. The dynamics of scientific research processes, both in terms of timing and 
reference structure (e.g. the theoretical issues considered important), is very different 
from the dynamics of an implementation process with a need for swift feedback 
concerning challenges that may be irrelevant from a scientific point of view. 
 
Continual use of the results of the evaluation can take place on several levels, from 
taking a more general position, over the actual allocation of tasks and responsibilities 
between various players, to changes in how local units function. Those parts of the 
evaluation that are carried out with an eye to continuous feedback must therefore be 
directed at these different levels. Such an evaluation requires a close relationship 
between those evaluating and the various players who will be using the results of the 
evaluation (Hansen, 2005); this may possibly challenge autonomy and the arm’s 
length principle. Some evaluation researchers who emphasize direct use, for example, 
Patton (Patton, 1997), have therefore underlined that instead of distance and arm’s 
length, evaluations require nearness to those who will need to use the evaluation 
continuously. Furthermore, the view is put forward that evaluations with such 
instrumental objectives must mean that an evaluator must be involved in the firms that 
are to be evaluated. 
 
Here we are dealing with a paradox – in the sense of an apparent contradiction – when 
the objective is both continuous feedback and long-term knowledge development. 
Whether it really is a case of a genuine conflict between the requirement of autonomy 
in long-term knowledge development and the demands of continuous useful feedback 
is subject to different opinions. Yet such different objectives for use do give rise to a 
number of challenges for the evaluator, which must be taken into account. We 
understand that it may be advisable from a tactical perspective to insist in the 
planning phase that different objectives be included in the evaluation. One way to 
cope with the challenge may possibly be to organize different research projects for the 
different purposes within the overall research design. Another may be to assign 
responsibilities to the different purposes to specific evaluators within each research 
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project. However if the challenge is not attended to it is likely to result in a negative 
in the outcome of the evaluation.  
 
The evaluation of the NAV reform provides evidence of the problems that arise when 
evaluations with several intended uses are to be conducted. Although it is possible 
design an evaluation that is aimed at long-term knowledge development in such a way 
that it also can contribute to continuous instrumental use, this form of use is unlikely 
to be the key strength of a research agency based evaluation. Decisions on the 
organization of future evaluations should therefore also take into account 
considerations of the extent to which different types of organizations are conducive to 
different intended uses. 
 
Attention point 6: How is flexibility incorporated in the evaluation process? 
 
In the theory section, we described certain characteristics of large-scale public sector 
reforms. Among other things, it was pointed out that the real nature of the reform to a 
high degree is developed in the implementation process itself. This has become very 
clear in the case of the NAV reform. Whether it is the intended reform or the actual 
reform that is being evaluated will therefore depend on how the evaluation is decided 
upon and designed. It is important to strive to evaluate the reform that actually has 
been carried out. 
 
Various ideas about how to do so can be found in the empirical study in the meta-
evaluation of the evaluation of the NAV reform. The most important are first, to 
maintain a ‘wait and see’ attitude during the first phase of the evaluation in order to 
observe how the reform develops in practice, and second, and related to this, to 
reserve a pool of funds for unforeseen analyses that prove to be particularly important 
during the evaluation. In this way the steering committee, in cooperation with the 
project and module managers are given a more significant task than in traditional 
research projects of developing the evaluation design while reflecting on how the 
reform is developing. The disadvantage can be a continuous “political tug-of-war” for 
these funds. 
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In any case, the changeability of the reform itself during the implementation process 
must be seen as a key question in the evaluations. This aspect was not taken 
adequately into account in the decision-making and design of the NAV evaluation. It 
should therefore be discussed in more detail in connection with future evaluations.  
 
Attention point 7: How ambitious should one be about integrating different research 
modules in an evaluation? 
 
In the empirical study in the meta-evaluation of the evaluation of the NAV reform, 
several researchers raised the question of how ambitious one should be with regard to 
coordinating and integrating different research modules in a larger joint research 
project, and whether, alternatively, one should to a higher degree work with more 
loosely connected project coordination or several independent research projects. The 
argument against ambitious integration is that much time and many resources can be 
wasted on trying to integrate different research traditions that are very difficult if not 
impossible to bridge. The argument in favour of ambitious integration is that different 
research projects, whose connections have been thoroughly thought through, can 
strengthen the credibility of the overall research design. 
 
This is an important attention point, which depends on an assessment of the specific 
evaluation task. The empirical analyses of the meta-evaluation and the final 
conference of the NAV evaluation suggest, however, that considerable progress has 
been made with the coordination strategy, despite numerous frustrations along the 
way. The process evaluations thus provide credible suggestions for the processes that 
can explain the results of the effect evaluations. Furthermore, various recent trends 
within evaluation theory (Chen, 2014; Hansen & Vedung, 2010; Pawson, 2013) 
indicate that mapping of the links between cause and effect in process evaluations are 
often decisive for being able to determine whether effects that are identified in 
measurements of effect are the result of the reform or of other circumstances – and 
even more importantly, what characteristics of the reform and its context have 
brought about the effects. 
 
Attention point 8: Should the possibilities for evaluating reform impact be 
incorporated in the reform decision and the implementation of reforms? 
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The challenges encountered in the NAV evaluation in terms of identifying effects 
bring into focus the discussion of the extent to which evaluation should be taken into 
account in connection with the organization of large-scale public sector reforms. 
Should reforms ideally be organized in such a way that “proper” measurements of 
effect can be carried out, organized as quasi-experiments with (ideally) randomized 
control groups and before and after measurements? This is an old idea from the 1960s 
and practice since then indicates that it is seldom – if ever – possible – in the case of 
large-scale public sector reforms. 
 
To begin with, there should be a consensus of opinion today, also between the 
different sides of the evidence debate, on the fact that the possibilities to make 
statements with certainty about the effects of large-scale public sector reforms are 
very limited. The different institutes (e.g. Cochrane and Campbell) that work with 
these questions have shown that most evaluations by far, including those carried out 
by well-established researchers, do not contribute with this sort of knowledge. The 
other side of the debate has, among other things, discussed the very question of what 
type of knowledge can be considered evident and what should fundamentally be 
understood by evidence. We therefore consider these points of view in principle as 
unrealistic, not just with regard to how politics comes into being but also with regard 
to the possibilities that the production of knowledge creates.   
This point of view is also problematic from a democratic perspective since it implies 
that politicians’ demands are subordinate to the production of knowledge in society 
and the demands that are put forth by evaluators. This raises the question of what role 
the measurements of effect should have and how they should be organized in 
connection with large-scale public sector reforms. As in the case of the NAV-reform, 
sometimes it may be possible to organize large-scale effect measurements of 
important aspects of the reform as a part of the evaluation design (Andreassen and 
Aars 2015). Sometimes it may be possible in retrospect to reconstruct the effects of 
reform efforts with reasonable validity based on register and a combination of 
secondary data as in a recent analysis of the impact the New Public Management 
reforms in the UK (Hood & Dixon, 2015). This is however not a question that can be 
answered in general terms but it is an important point of attention when organizing 
evaluations of large-scale public sector reforms. 
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Conclusion 
 
The eight attention points of the meta-evaluation discussed above have been found 
through an analysis of a single and rare case – the evaluation of the NAV reform in 
Norway – and we have argued that they are likely to be of relevance to most if not all 
evaluations of large-scale public sector reforms. The eight attention points are listed 
in table 1 below. 
 
*** Around here table 1*** 
 
We have worded the eight points as questions, which decision makers involved in the 
evaluation of large-scale public sector reforms should take into consideration, and we 
have attempted to show the typical issues of balancing and trade-offs that characterize 
each attention point. 
 
The eight attention points are likely to have general relevance and are essential to 
consider and to take into account when organizing future evaluations of large-scale 
public sector reforms and many of them are likely to have more general relevance to 
the organization of other types of evaluations.  
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End note 
 
1 A meta-evaluation should not be confused with meta-analyses. A meta-evaluation is simply an 
analysis of the value of one or more evaluations (Stufflebeam, 2001) that are intended to be used in 
future decision-making processes. 
 
 
Table	  1:	  Eight	  Attention	  Points	  for	  the	  Evaluation	  of	  Large-­‐Scale	  Public	  Sector	  Reforms	  1	   What	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  are	  there	  in	  connection	  with	  an	  
external	  research-­‐based	  evaluation	  compared	  to	  alternative	  models?	  2	   What	  actors	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  evaluation	  task	  for	  
the	  evaluation	  of	  large-­‐scale	  public	  sector	  reforms?	  3	   Which	  members	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  steering	  committee?	  4	   What	  principles	  should	  characterize	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  steering	  
committee	  and	  researchers?	  5	   How	  can	  the	  numerous	  and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐reconcile	  objectives	  of	  the	  evaluation	  
be	  dealt	  with?	  6	   How	  is	  flexibility	  incorporated	  in	  the	  evaluation	  process?	  7	   How	  ambitious	  should	  one	  be	  about	  integrating	  different	  research	  modules	  
in	  an	  evaluation?	  8	   	  Should	  the	  possibilities	  for	  evaluating	  reform	  impact	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  
reform	  decision	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  reforms?	  
 
